Editor’s note: Nettalie Viljoen, Moonstone Information Refinery’s deputy managing editor of publications, recently visited Taiwan. She was among a group of journalists from around the world who were invited to visit the country by the Taiwanese government. In this article, she provides a perspective on the tensions between the island and its powerful neighbour across the Taiwan Strait.
It is a Friday afternoon in Dihua Street, Dadaocheng. Locals and tourists alike browse among a colourful selection of herbs, incense, fabrics, and tea shops that line the oldest street in Taipei. Seeing all the hustle and bustle, it is hard to imagine this vibrant scene being ripped apart by airstrikes, yet a number of political analysts have declared this unthinkable scenario “inevitable”.
Speculation surrounding the possible invasion of Taiwan – officially, the Republic of China (ROC) – by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been running rife since January 2019 when Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the people of Taiwan to accept that it “must and will be” reunited with the mainland. While reiterating Beijing’s call for peaceful unification on a one-country-two-systems basis – the same system applied in Hong Kong – Xi also warned that China reserved the right to use force.
Addressing a group of visiting international journalists during a press briefing in Taipei earlier this month, Taiwan Foreign Minister Dr Jaushieh Wu said that speculation over when China might invade was not helpful. He said what was vital was for Taiwan to understand the types of military threat China posed and for the country to be prepared.
“I think there’s a growing consensus among the key analysts in the US and also in Taiwan, war is not inevitable, and war is not imminent,” Wu said.
To dissuade China from using force against Taiwan, Wu said they were pursuing two strategies – upholding a responsible, non-provocative cross-strait policy and implementing sufficient military deterrence capabilities.
“And up until today, that policy seems to be working rather well. China could not find any excuse to formally launch an attack against Taiwan. They may threaten Taiwan, but they are not attacking us yet. And we will continue this policy,” he said.
Military preparation
On the military front, Wu said although they were pursuing a responsible policy, they also needed to have sufficient deterrence capabilities to allow China “to understand that it would not be easy” for them to invade the island.
To this end, Taiwan has increased its military budget and has engaged in “serious military reforms”.
Wu said they were working on procuring arms from the US.
“We have been reforming our military training. We have been extending our mandatory military service, and we are also engaging in real serious exchanges with a key partner of ours, the US, for our military to be better trained.”
According to information shared by the Institute for National Defence and Security Research (INDSR), a Taiwanese think tank based in Taipei, the country has 200 000 active and 3 million reserved military personnel. Last year, Taiwan extended its mandatory military service from four months to a year. Military training encompasses becoming adept at asymmetric warfare tactics – the same military strategy being implemented by Ukraine against Russia.
‘Total Defence Strategy’
In addition to assimilating the asymmetric warfare concept, the Taiwanese government was pursuing a “Total Defence Strategy” aimed at fostering closer relations between Taiwan’s military and civilians.
According to a survey on “Public views on current cross-strait issues”, commissioned by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, of the 1 081 Taiwanese citizens interviewed, 1.7% were in support of unification with mainland China.
A total of 87.1% were in favour of maintaining the status quo. In this percentage category, 6.4% were in support of unification later, 27.4% opted for deciding on independence or unification later, 34.3% wanted to maintain the status quo indefinitely, and 19% called for independence later. Of the respondents, 4.7 % were in support of declaring independence as soon as possible, while 6.6% said they did not know or had no opinion.
Weighing in on Beijing’s call for peaceful unification on a one-country-two-systems basis, 84.3% either disapproved (27.6%) or strongly disapproved (56.7%). A total of 82.6% believed that Taiwan’s future and the development of cross-strait relations must be decided by the people of Taiwan.
Is a poorer China a friendlier China?
Fears about the health of China’s economy have been making headlines across the globe in the past few months. Global asset and wealth manager Schroders recently cut their previously expected GDP growth of 6.5% this year to 4.8%, based on “a marked deterioration in the recent incoming data, and lack of urgency from the government to stimulate activity”.
David Rees, senior emerging markets economist at Schroders, says despite the relaxation of the zero-Covid policy, which led to a burst of activity in transport-related services, booming travel failed to translate into broader consumer spending in China. Rees said one reason for the apparent reluctance to spend appears to be weak consumer confidence.
A major dampener for confidence, he said, is the ongoing problems in the real estate market. He adds problems in the housing market are likely to have several consequences for the broader economy, with the more immediate one being the weakening of a key transmission mechanism for policy support to boost activity.
So, Xi definitely does have his hands full, but will this be enough to deter China from invading Taiwan?
While Wu agreed that an imminent full-scale invasion seemed unlikely, he said it could not be ruled out entirely.
“When a major power experiences an economic slowdown, it tends to be more provocative to others to maintain its global influence. And especially when an authoritarian country is experiencing policy difficulties, they may resort to an external crisis to divert the domestic attention and to keep the country together,” he said.
Risks of major escalation
The growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait – the 180km-wide strait separating the island of Taiwan and continental Asia – have led to many international research houses contemplating what the scenarios and risks of a major escalation, short of war, in this area, might be.
The strait is part of the South China Sea and connects to the East China Sea to the north. The gateway is used by ships of almost every kind on passage to and from nearly all the important ports in north-east Asia. According to Bloomberg, nearly half the world’s container ships passed through the Taiwan Strait in the first seven months of 2022.
A recent research report, done in collaboration between Rhodium Group and the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, stated that a maximalist scenario involving sanctions on the largest institutions in China’s banking system would put at least $3 trillion in trade and financial flows, not including foreign reserve assets, at immediate risk of disruption.
The report titled “Sanctioning China in a Taiwan Crisis: Scenarios and Risks” also points out that should – in the case of a major crisis – large-scale sanctions be imposed against China, the G7’s differences on Taiwan’s legal status may prove a hurdle “when seeking rapid alignment on sanctions”.
Taiwan’s legal status
The ambiguity surrounding the political status of Taiwan dates as far back as 1949 when, after losing the Chinese Civil War in the mainland to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the remnants of the internationally recognised Kuomintang-ruled government of the ROC relocated to Taiwan, an island located at the junction of the East and South China Seas in the northwestern Pacific.
In the years past, Taiwan has maintained that it is a de facto independent country (not ruled by China), and as of 1996, it has been led by a democratically elected president. Today, the island, covering 35 808km2, is home to 23 million people. The non-profit organisation group Freedom House rates Taiwan as among the most “free” nations in Asia, with a 1 in both political rights and civil liberties.
The PRC asserts that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 – which gave Beijing the “Chinese seat” at the UN – endorses the country’s “One China Principle”, and member states, therefore, accept that Taiwan is a part of China.
Passed on 25 October 1971, the resolution recognised the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the UN”. Up to that point, the ROC held the China seat. It had done so since the UN’s establishment in 1945.
The “One China Principle”, as Wikipedia explains, holds that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, with the PRC serving as the sole legitimate government of that China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. It is opposed to the idea that there are two states holding the name “China” – ROC and PRC – as well as the idea that China and Taiwan form two separate countries.
Taiwan’s interpretation of the “One China Principle” is far more complicated. For example, there is the interpretation of the 1992 Consensus asserted by the ROC’s then-governing political party KMT that both the PRC and the ROC had agreed that there is one “China” but disagreed on whether “China” was represented by the PRC or ROC. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the current ruling party in Taiwan, however, has never acknowledged the existence of the consensus and rejected any claim that both sides of the Taiwan Strait as one “China”.
There does seem to be consensus in Taiwan, though, that the PRC’s use of the UN resolution – which, as Wu pointed out, nowhere references Taiwan by name – to validate its “One China Principle” is disingenuous.
Citing a letter received from the UN Secretariat in 2007, Wu said the UN has in the past indicated that it accepted the PRC’s interpretation of the resolution.
“We tried to deposit one of our parliament decisions, our adoption of CEDAW, a UN coalition against all forms of discrimination against women. The UN Secretariat responded with a letter indicating that according to resolution 2758, the UN for all purposes, considers Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC,” said Wu.
He said their concern was that the PRC might be using its influence in the UN to carry out legal warfare – a way for the PRC to legalise not only its use of force against Taiwan but also to establish Taiwan as China’s “domestic matters”, removing the right of other countries to intervene in these “domestic affairs” in case of an invasion.
Can Taiwan withstand a full-scale invasion?
However, according to the INDSR acting deputy chief executive officer director of the Divisions of National Security Research, Dr Ming-Shih Shen, an immediate full-scale invasion by China seemed less likely at the moment.
“I will not say impossible, because if you look at the decision-making of (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, you will see that Russia was actually not prepared for a full-scale invasion (of Ukraine in February 2022), but they did that. So, I will say not 100% impossible, but less likely,” says Shen.
First off, he said an invasion of Taiwan would be challenging given its terrain.
“We have around a dozen or so beaches which are good for amphibian landing. But if you look at our preparation there, if you travel around Taiwan, you will find that the depth and the width are only fit for a (single) battalion class unit. That is very beneficial for defenders.”
As a result, for China to project their troops into Taiwan, they would have to combine amphibious with airborne and heliborne attacks.
“And that will be very difficult. Currently, the PRC is not really well prepared for that. They are (busy) preparing, but there is still a large gap.”
Shen said the Chinese personnel arrangement in the country’s party congress last year served as more evidence that invasion wasn’t imminent. He said if you looked at the central military commission of the CCP, the standing members were mainly from the army and political commissars instead of the air force or naval generals, and so on.
“That’s actually not an arrangement for a modern combined arms military operation but mainly focused on (maintaining) domestic stabilities.”
Asked whether Taiwan would be strong enough to hold off China in case of a full-scale invasion, Shen said yes and no. He said their biggest defence advantage was the significant breadth of the Taiwan Strait.
“The Taiwan Strait will cause a lot of problems for China to project their troops to Taiwan. We also have a very well-trained air force and naval forces which actually defended Taiwan in the Cold War and even until now.”
He said, at present, they were improving their defence operation by strengthening their ground forces’ training, implementing emerging technologies, and modernising their forces to maintain their advantage. But in case of a blockade, as implemented during the Russia-Ukraine war, Shen said Taiwan would not be able to stand forever.
“We might defend for months, maybe for years, but not indefinitely. Taiwan will still need support from the global society like Ukraine needs weapon and material delivery because we are an island,” he said.
Wu said they hoped that a full-scale invasion would never happen.
“The Chinese, if they’re smart enough, I don’t think they should think about the use of force.”
But, referring to Sun Tzu’s ancient Chinese military philosophy, he said the number-one principle of the legendary military strategist was to crush the enemy without going to war.
“And I think the Chinese, with its attrition of the united fronts, military threats, economic coercions, hybrid warfare, and grey-zone activities, is trying to crush Taiwan’s will. And we will stand strong. We will stand strong because we know that democracies around the world are supporting us.”
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and are not necessarily shared by Moonstone Information Refinery or its sister companies.
